The Resistible Rise of Reform UK

The May election results were a warning, if one was needed, of the danger of an insurgent Reform UK.  Sarah Pochin won the Runcorn and Helsey by-election for Reform with 38.7% of the vote. In the local council elections, Reform’s share of the vote hit 31%, enabling it to gain 677 out of the 1,650 seats up for grabs.

In total, Reform took control of ten councils and to top this off it also won its first mayors, Andrea Jenkyns in Greater Lincolnshire and Luke Campbell in Hull and East Yorkshire.

Formed in November 2018, Reform UK has five MPs, and a membership of 230,000. One recent poll by political advisory company True North revealed that 30% of the electorate back Reform.

A YouGov poll also found that just over 40% of those polled believe Nigel Farage (Reform UK’s leader) will be Britain’s next prime minister.

The meteoric rise of Reform is worrying the government and prime minister Keir Starmer reportedly told a meeting of Labour MPs: “The Conservatives are not our principal opponent. Reform are our main rivals”.

However, many were disappointed with Labour’s response and Starmer’s “big immigration speech” in May prompted accusations that he is trying to “out-Reform Reform”. Reform is dragging Britain’s mainstream political parties to the right.

A brief history of Reform UK

The roots of Reform, and its talisman Nigel Farage, go back to the formation of UKIP in 1993. UKIP began life as a single-issue Eurosceptic party that acted as ginger group on the fringes of the Conservative Party.

Farage became its leader in 1996 and promoted a wider political programme and, perhaps more significantly and in common with other European far-right parties, began to campaign against migration and asylum seekers.

UKIP went onto to make significant electoral gains, firstly in the 2013 council elections where it won 147 seats, usurping the fascist British National Party as Britain’s main far-right party.

UKIP’s electoral success continued in the 2014 European parliamentary elections winning 24 MEPs and in the 2015 General Election it gained 12.6% of the vote and one MP.

Farage went on to play a prominent role in the Brexit referendum. In 2018 he quit UKIP stating that it was “unrecognisable” because of its “fixation with anti-Muslim policies” and its decision to appoint fascist Tommy Robinson as a political advisor.

The following year Farage launched the Brexit Party becoming its self-declared leader. In the EU elections that year the Brexit Party won 29 MEPs, gaining the highest share of the vote.

However, it failed to gain any seats in that year’s parliamentary elections. The party’s parliamentary breakthrough came in the 2024 General Election where it won five seats gaining 14.3% of the total vote. It was the third largest party by popular vote.

Key issues motivating Reform voters

Reform appeals to disillusioned voters concerned with immigration, but some Reform voters are motivated by other issues (See Table 1).

Farage is trying to reposition Reform by “softening its image” and expanding its political base of support. It looks to appeal to disillusioned Labour voters with promises to reverse disability benefit cuts, reinstate the winter fuel allowance and save manufacturing jobs.

However, even the most cursory examination of Reform’s manifesto reveals a right-wing agenda that would see the NHS privatised, public services slashed and trade union rights restricted.

At the same time Reform continues to appeal to its core supporters, especially on the question of migration.

Disillusionment

Labour’s latest stance on immigration has allowed Farage to claim that Labour is simply mimicking Reform.

There is one other important factor driving up Reform’s appeal – disillusionment with the mainstream parties.

According to a YouGov poll conducted in January 2025, over 19% of Reform voters say the main reason for their support is because it is neither Labour nor Conservative.

One YouGov shows that nearly a quarter of all Britons (24%) said that they would consider voting for Reform in future elections:

This includes 33% of those who voted for the Conservatives at last year’s general election, 9% of those who voted Labour and 8% of Lib Dems.

Who votes Reform?

Election data compiled by The Political Quarterly Journal shows a clear correlation between areas where UKIP did well in the 2015 General Election and where Reform performed strongly in the 2024 General Election.

It also shows that although many of those who voted Reform in 2024 were ex-UKIP voters, the majority of Reform voters did not previously vote UKIP, in 2015, 37% had done so, but slightly more, 41.5%, had voted Conservative.

The latest data looking at the social base of Reform voters was compiled just before the 2024 general election. It shows that Reform voters have a distinctive social and political profile. As Table 2 demonstrates, they tend to be middle aged, with a slight bias towards men, and previous supporters of the Conservative Party.

The different political landscape since the 2024 General Election, leaves gaps in our understanding of the changing demographics of Reform support. The pollster Sir John Curtis argues:

Although polls indicate that Reform finds it easier to win over former Conservative voters than their Labour counterparts. Reforms average share of the vote was strikingly just as high in wards that Labour was defending as it was in places that the Conservatives were trying to defend.  

A smaller poll of 304 Reform voters conducted by a PhD student in March 2025, provides a snapshot of Reform’s social base (See Table 3).

This partial study reinforces The Political Quarterly Journal’s survey and provides some further insights, suggesting that Reform’s support is strongest amongst those who are either self-employed or in skilled trades. It also points to an increase in support among Labour voters and women.   

What type of party is Reform?

Some commentators describe Reform as a “fascist type” party – a mistaken description that can weaken campaigns to challenge the party. Searchlight has highlighted individual fascists who have tried to infiltrate Reform, but this does not make it a fascist party.

Reform does share some political features with so-called classical fascist parties (1920s and 1930s), including extreme nationalism, scapegoating and demonisation of the left and minorities.

But there are two fundamental differences between classical fascism and Reform’s current political theory and practice.

The first is fascists use paramilitary violence and street movements to crush opponents. Secondly, fascism has been used by sections of the ruling class to smash working class organisations. Reform has no paramilitary forces; it has not attempted to control the streets and has not physically attacked political opponents.

And currently no section of the ruling class feels the need to use paramilitary forces to crush dissent. Reform is wedded to the idea of gaining power through the democratic system.

However, we live in an era where political cross-fertilisation is bringing about greater co-operation between the different strands of the global far right and in some cases this has created sharp changes in political practice.

Far-right populism

Hungary is a good example of this processes in action. Fidesz, was originally a centre-right formation, 20 years on it is an authoritarian far-right populist party. Likewise the Hungarian Jobbik movement has moved in the opposite direction.

It began life as the most extreme fascist movement in Europe, but as it attempted to expand its electoral base it shed its fascist policies and paraphernalia and now accurately describes itself as a centre-right party.

Equally, it is also mistaken to treat Reform as just a right-wing version of the Conservative Party. It is true that most of its leading figures are ex-members of the Conservative Party.

Clearly some of its policies – a minimalist state, free market economics and “traditional family values” have their origins in the Thatcherite wing of the Tory Party.

However, Reform’s trajectory is a dangerous far-right break with mainstream Conservatism. The party’s scapegoating of migrants, promotion of antisemitic tropes and Islamophobia create a toxic environment, one that allows even more extreme groups to flourish.

So, what type of party is Reform? It is a hybrid formation with an ideology shaped by the extreme right of the Conservative Party and a Trumpian version of far-right populism.

Just because Reform is not a fascist party, it is unwise to downplay its threat. Once again Viktor Orbán’s far-right populist Fidesz government in Hungary provides ample evidence of the danger.

Since the election of Orbán in 2010, Hungary has become an authoritarian state that has taken political control of the judicial system, media universities and cultural institutions.

Orbán has promoted anti-Roma racism, launched hostile campaigns against migrants and promoted antisemitism in his election campaigns.         

How do we stop Reform?

The rise of Reform poses a massive challenge. Our movement has a wealth of experience smashing the Nazi National Front in the 1970s, the Nazi British National Party in the 1990s and the 2000s and the far-right street movements that emerged in the last decade. We can and must utilise this wealth of experience.

However, Reform is a different beast and new strategies, and tactics are needed. We face three major problems when challenging Reform.

Hard hitting propaganda

The first is that it is largest and most entrenched far-right movement Britain has seen. Without diminishing in anyway the threat of the BNP, its electoral success was limited to a few towns, cities and boroughs blighted by deindustrialisation.

It was possible for organisations like Unite Against Fascism and Hope not Hate to target these wards and constituencies with hard hitting anti-Nazi propaganda.

We were able to mass leaflet and canvas every home; trade unionists and student groups organised against the Nazis in workplaces and colleges; and gigs/festivals attracted school and college students to the anti-racist cause.

This time we face a party that has the support of 30% of the electorate and one which is spread across the country.

The second problem is the “normalisation” of Reform.  Propaganda aimed at the BNP had one simple effective message – “Don’t Vote Nazi”. The BNP was a Nazi party, and most people knew it. So much so that even those who voted BNP were embarrassed to say so.

Reform voters have no such qualms, they attend the party’s political rallies in large numbers, put up Reform election posters in their windows and according to the NEU there are examples of school students standing as Reform candidates in school elections.

The last problem is perhaps the most challenging. An anti-Reform campaign will not be enough. Reform’s racism will have to be challenged at the ballot box. As stated above, the campaigns against the BNP focused on a simple slogan “Don’t Vote Nazi”.

Standing together

Although never openly stated, it was implicit that voting Labour was the alternative. For some, however, this alternative is no longer palatable.

Many in the anti-racist movement will be voting Labour, but others will be supporting groups such as the Greens, the radical left, the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru.

We may disagree over which party to support, but if we are going to build a successful anti-racist movement, we must stand together.

When our prime minister says that immigration means we risk becoming “an island of strangers”, our motto should be:

‘There are no strangers here: only friends we haven’t yet met’